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THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CONUNDRUM 
Eric Schnapper* 
LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPITAL 
CASES. By Welsh S. White. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press. 1984. Pp. xii, 289. $19.95. 
After almost two decades of Supreme Court capital punishment 
decisions, the time has certainly arrived for a comprehensive evalua-
tion of the complex of interrelated problems that continue to embroil 
and confound the Court. In the late 1960s, an intelligent observer 
might have thought that the only unresolved constitutional issue 
raised by the death penalty was whether such punishment violated the 
eighth amendment. Today capital punishment has emerged as a major 
branch of constitutional jurisprudence, encompassing questions re-
garding the right to jury trial, cruel and unusual punishment, and pro-
cedural and substantive due process. Virtually no one seems happy 
with the results. Many members of the Supreme Court appear uncom-
fortable with the erratic pattern of that Court's decisions, and an-
noyed, at the least, with the persistence and diversity of the continuing 
attacks on capital punishment procedures. Defense attorneys, on the 
other hand, perceive in that pattern an increasing unwillingness on the 
part of the Court to take seriously its responsibility to evaluate fairly 
the methods by which states are deciding which defendants will live 
and which are to die. Professor Hugo Bedau, in a foreword to this 
book, accuses the Court of having "contributed at least as much ob-
scurity as clarity to the basic moral and constitutional issues involved" 
(p. vii). All three of these very different views find colorable support 
in the case law. 
Professor Welsh White, who has followed these developments 
closely both as a litigator and as a scholar, has without question the 
experience and analytic skill needed to write a book providing a valu-
able overview of this complex and evolving body oflaw. But, regretta-
bly, he has not yet attempted to do so. Life in the Balance consists 
largely of seven law review articles previously published by Professor 
White between 1974 and 1984. In capital punishment law, where d~c­
trines and Supreme Court majorities seem to shift annually, a ten-
year-old legal analysis is often no more valuable a tool for understand-
ing the present state of affairs, and predicting future developments, 
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than a ten-year-old scouting report on the Chicago Bears. White's 
1974 commentary on the meaning of Furman v. Georgia, 1 for example, 
may be most significant as an illustration of how much the 1976 deci-
sion in Gregg v. Georgia2 was unforeseen by scholars and litigators 
alike. Others of the articles demonstrate White's astuteness in predict-
ing subsequent legal developments, but his 1976 article arguing that 
capital punishment should not be imposed for the crime of rape, for 
example, is necessarily less important reading than the Supreme 
Court's 1977 decision3 on that subject. Substantially more current are 
White's articles regarding police interrogation techniques and the use 
of psychiatric testimony in capital cases, but these subjects are not at 
the core of capital punishment debates or litigation. The most valua-
ble part of Life in the Balance is the portion that White wrote for the 
book itself-an introductory overview of the evolution of capital pun-
ishment law and a number of short "updates" of the earlier articles. 
Professor Bedau quotes an attorney involved in capital punishment 
litigation as observing, with regard to his practice, "We've become 
technicians. The great moral issues have been removed from the legal 
arena" (p. vii). For a reader unfamiliar with what has occurred in this 
area of the law, White's analysis of some of those technical issues, par-
ticularly the problems of jury selection and psychiatric testimony in 
capital cases, provides a flavor of the complex practical and legal is-
sues in which capital litigation has become embroiled. But White of-
fers no serious account of how capital punishment case law evolved, or 
devolved, from the grand issues of Furman and Gregg to narrower and 
more individualized disputes, such as that in Estelle v. Smith 4 regard-
ing psychiatric testimony at sentencing hearings. White's articles, 
Bedau suggests, demonstrate that the current state of the law is "little 
more than an uneasy compromise among those who firmly refuse to 
give up the death penalty altogether, others who would destroy execu-
tions root and branch once and for all, and still others whose strongest 
commitment is . . . the desire to preserve federalism and state sover-
eignty" (p. vii). Were that the case, the current state and future course 
of the so-called technical issues would be equally unintelligible. ; A 
scholar who saw those three extreme positions as the only alternatives 
would have little reason to analyze the emerging technical issues, other 
than to seek to use those issues to support one of the extreme alterna-
tives - arguing, for example, that a particular technical issue is in-
solvable, and thus dictates abandonment of capital punishment 
altogether. 
White does not pursue any such nihilistic approach, but his analy-
I. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
2. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
3. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
4. 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
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ses do not attempt to offer an account of why the middle of the Court 
continues to avoid all three of the extreme positions described by 
Bedau, rejecting some arguments against particular death sentences, 
agreeing with others, all the while spawning new issues that seem in-
creasingly narrow and complex. Proponents and opponents of capital 
punishment both have institutional interests in avoiding any effort to 
articulate an intermediate view, since their own arguments are 
strengthened by asserting that the only alternative to their position is, 
respectively, abolition of capital punishment for even the most vile of 
offenses, or the slaughter of hundreds of defendants selected from 
among many other equally culpable murderers on an arbitrary or even 
racial basis. But litigators who must practice in the present legal envi-
ronment remain in need of some general analysis, broader than 
White's discussions of specific issues, of what the middle of the 
Supreme Court is doing and where it may be headed. 
The case law sketched by Professor White suggests that the 
Supreme Court has indeed recognized the existence of many of the 
constitutional problems of which he complains. The Court has cho-
sen, not to adopt the sort of broad per se rules which would guarantee 
an end to any constitutional violations, but to afford the states a 
chance to develop procedures that will be free of the identified consti-
tutional vices. This compromise has taken two somewhat distinct 
forms. First, as I discuss in Part I, the Court in Gregg and its progeny 
has given the states an opportunity to develop general sentencing pro-
cedures that may in practice prove free of the arbitrariness condemned 
in Furman; disputes regarding whether particular procedures have 
met that goal have inevitably become, and are likely to remain, an 
ongoing source of litigation. Second, the Court has permitted the 
states to adjust certain practices on a case-by-case basis in order to 
avoid violations of identified constitutional rights; Part II describes the 
manner in which this apprpach has predictably led to a large number 
of meritorious or at least colorable appeals. 
I. THE GREGG EXPERIMENT 
The legal development that seems to exemplify best what both pro-
ponents and opponents of capital punishment object to is the apparent 
shift in the law from Furman to Gregg. In 1972 Furman struck down 
capital punishment as that penalty was then administered, holding 
that the number of individuals condemned to death, and actually exe-
cuted, was so small that the selection of those who were to die was 
both arbitrary and freakish. In Furman, as in a number of later cases, 
there was no majority opinion. Justice Stewart, who apparently pro-
vided the swing vote, explained that "[t]hese death sentences are cruel 
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel 
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and unusual."5 Because all members of the Furman majority empha-
sized that the states condemned to death only a small proportion of 
the defendants who committed capital offenses, many commentators, 
Professor White among them, assumed that, if the Supreme Court 
were to uphold any future capital punishment statutes, the Court 
would require that the statutes make that penalty mandatory (pp. 24-
25). 
Gregg and its companion cases, decided in 1976, held precisely the 
opposite, concluding that mandatory capital punishment statutes were 
unconstitutional per se. 6 Those decisions upheld capital punishment 
statutes in Georgia, Texas, and Florida that expressly conferred on 
juries discretion to decide whether a defendant was to live or die, and 
that established various types of standards to "guide" juries in the ex-
ercise of that discretion. 7 Justices White and Rehnquist subsequently 
characterized Gregg's rejection of anything smacking of a mandatory 
sentence as a complete reversal of the principles of Furman. 8 Death 
penalty critics, on the other hand, saw little basis for believing that the 
statutes approved in Gregg would, in operation, be any less arbitrary 
than the practice condemned in Furman; to them Gregg simply 
marked an abandonment of the principles of Furman, a callous and 
calculated decision to reinstate the death penalty regardless of how 
arbitrary its application might be. 
Subsequent decisions seemed to confirm those fears. The plurality 
opinion in Gregg had emphasized that the Georgia statute contained 
an express provision requiring systematic appellate review of particu-
lar death sentences to assure that they were proportionate to sentences 
imposed in other cases. In Pulley v. Harris 9 the petitioner challenged 
the California capital punishment statute on the ground that it lacked 
any such provision for proportionality review; the Court held that, at 
least in the context of the specific California statute at issue, no such 
review procedure was constitutionally required. Similarly, the Gregg 
plurality, in rejecting claims that the death penalty was cruel and un-
usual, emphasized that juries, which were presumed to reflect commu-
nity values, continued to vote to impose that penalty; subsequently, in 
Spaziano v. Florida, 10 however, the Court held that a state judge could 
constitutionally sentence a defendant to death even though the jury 
had voted against that sentence. Both Pulley and Spaziano stressed 
that the Court was unwilling to establish any one system for imposing 
5. 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
6. Mandatory death penalties were held unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
7. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
8. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 622 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); 438 U.S. at 631 (Rehn· 
quist, J., dissenting). 
9. 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
10. 468 U.S. 447 (1984). 
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the death penalty, and in both decisions the Court noted that it was 
rejecting the claims involved only under the specific circumstances of 
those particular cases. 
Professor White has no doubt that all capital punishment laws will 
be as arbitrary and freakish in their application as the statutes con-
demned in Furman. Statutes such as that approved in Gregg, he 
writes, contain guidelines "so broad and amorphous as to have the 
effect of vesting the capital sentencer with almost the same total dis-
cretion that the pre-Furn1an statutes vested in the sentencing jury."11 
Any system that permits prosecutors to refrain from seeking the death 
penalty, or allows juries to avoid the possibility of such a sentence by 
convicting a particular defendant of a lesser offense, White argues, 
"will exhibit all of the vices that Furman found antithetical to the val-
ues of the Eighth Amendment" (p. 25). Gregg and its progeny seem to 
require both that a jury have sufficiently broad discretion to assure 
that any sentencing decision is based on the particular circumstances 
of each individual case, and that the exercise of any jury discretion be 
so circumscribed by "guidelines" as to assure that the imposition of 
the death penalty is reasonably uniform and predictable.12 Professor 
White insists that these two requirements are so clearly inconsistent 
that no statute could possibly satisfy both (pp. 3-4). 
Gregg can be understood, at least in part, as premised on a rejec-
tion of precisely the sort of analysis that Professor White offers of this 
problem. Professor Bedau, in a passage that was apparently intended 
to convey approval, describes White's methodology as "general and 
theoretical, as well as jurisprudential; hence narratives or case studies 
or statistically oriented investigations cannot suffice for his purposes" 
(p. vi). Gregg does not profess any abandonment of Furman's concern 
about the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty; 13 what Gregg re-
fuses to do is to predict on the basis of "general and theoretical, as well 
as jurisprudential" grounds that no guided discretion statute could 
possibly avoid such arbitrariness. Furman's condemnation of the capi-
tal sentencing laws of that era was based on several decades of actual 
experience with those statutes, not on any theoretical assumptions 
about how such statutes might operate. Despite some loose language, 
Gregg appears to leave open the possibility that one or more guided 
discretion statutes might prove as arbitrary in practice as the statutes 
11. Pp. 30-31. Elsewhere White predicts that the existence of statutory standards to guide 
juries in their selection of sentences "will neither alter the fundamentally discretionary character 
of capital sentencing nor change the pattern of rare, arbitrary, and freakish death penalties con-
demned by Furman." P. 3. 
12. The Supreme Court described its decisions as pursuing such "twin objectives" in Spazi-
ano, 468 U.S. at 459-60. 
13. On a number of occasions since Gregg the Court has reiterated that a capital punishment 
statute would be unconstitutional if in practice those who were to die were selected in an arbi-
trary and unpredictable manner. See, e.g., Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459-60 & n.7. 
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disapproved in Furman, and White himself reads Gregg to reserve res-
olution of that issue for some future date. 14 
Gregg may reflect a refusal by the Court to predict that every con-
ceivable guided discretion capital punishment statute would be un-
avoidably arbitrary and freakish in its application, and a decision to 
afford the states a reasonable opportunity to attempt to devise one or 
more sentencing schemes that would in operation be free of the vice 
condemned in Furman. A court concerned with affording the states 
such an opportunity would be understandably reluctant to sweep aside 
practices of general application that might be an essential part of a 
sentencing scheme, which, taken as a whole, significantly reduced the 
degree of arbitrariness present in Furman. Thus, although the prac-
tice upheld in Spaziano may well be, as Professor Gillers has argued, 15 
inconsistent with the sixth or eighth amendments, it is possible that 
permitting judges to overrule jury recommendations of life imprison-
ment may in time be shown to increase the degree of uniformity in the 
administration of the death sentence in Florida. If the Supreme Court 
takes seriously its commitment to Furman, it cannot permit the states 
to continue indefinitely to devise whatever schemes they please, how-
ever bizarre and constitutionally suspect, for administering the death 
penalty. But a certain interval for a reasonable degree of diversity and 
experimentation may be important to identifying the types of schemes 
that best reduce the degree of arbitrariness that existed in the past, or 
to establishing that no satisfactory scheme can in fact be fashioned. 
Although Professor White makes no effort to evaluate what actual 
experience has shown about the operation of guided discretion stat-
utes, the Supreme Court is increasingly in a position to do so. Within 
the last year two detailed and sophisticated sentencing studies have 
been published, one conducted by Professor Arnold Barnett of M.I.T., 
and a second by Professors David Baldus, George Woodworth, and 
Charles Pulaski, Jr. 16 The two studies, using quite distinct methodolo-
14. P. 15. In Spaziano the Court commented that "it is to be hoped that current procedures 
have greatly reduced the risk that jury sentencing will result in arbitrary or discriminatory appli· 
cation of the death penalty, see Gregg v. Georgia." 468 U.S. at 460. This passage seems to 
indicate that a capital defendant could seek to establish that the hope on which Gregg was based 
had proved unfounded. The Court upheld the death penalty in Spaziano in part because it saw 
"nothing that suggests that the •.. procedure has resulted in arbitrary or discriminatory applica-
tion of the death penalty, either in general or in this particular case." 468 U.S. at 466. 
The Court's decision in Pulley also appears to leave open the possibility that actual experience 
might demonstrate that a guided discretion statute was in fact as arbitrary and capricious as the 
statutes condemned in Furman: "Any capital sentencing scheme may occasionally produce aber-
rational outcomes. Such inconsistencies are a far cry from the major systemic defects identified 
in Furman. . . . As we are presently informed, we cannot say that the California procedures 
provided ... inadequate protection against the evil identified in Furman." 465 U.S. at 54 (em· 
phasis added). 
15. Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39-74 (1980). 
16. Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C.D. L. REV. 
1327 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Barnett Study]; Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, Monitoring and 
Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems; Lessons From Georgia, 18 U.C.D. L. REV. 
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gies and analyzing over 500 cases each, arrived at strikingly similar 
conclusions.17 Amongst all defendants convicted of murder, the pro-
portion ultimately sentenced to death averages less than twenty per-
cent.18 That proportion is clearly small enough to raise questions 
under Furman, absent substantial evidence that those condemned to 
death are in fact being selected in a reasonably uniform and predict-
able manner. The studies further indicate, however, that in certain 
types of cases the probability that a defendant will be sentenced to 
death is predictably high; both studies wen~ able to identify circum-
stances in which two-thirds or more of all defendants would receive 
that sentence.19 That high probability exists in certain categories of 
cases despite the exercise of discretion by prosecutors in deciding what 
crime to charge and what sentence to seek, and despite the ability of 
the jury not only to fix the sentence but also to convict a defendant of a 
lesser included offense. The application of the death penalty to this 
group involves a situation that is, to say the least, radically different 
from the situation condemned in Furman or the result predicted by 
Professor White. 
On the other hand, both studies found that a significant number of 
death sentences were being imposed on defendants in circumstances in 
which the death penalty was ordinarily extremely rare. The studies 
demonstrated that approximately one-third of all death sentences were 
being imposed under circumstances in which a majority of similarly 
situated defendants were only sentenced to imprisonment, and that 
about five percent of the death sentences were imposed in cases in 
which ninety percent of similarly situated defendants were spared. 20 
Neither study identified any circumstance or combination of circum.:. 
stances that could explain why these particular defendants had been 
singled out for execution, while apparently indistinguishable defen-
dants received life sentences instead.21 With regard to this subset of 
capital defendants, it appears that the states have not met their consti-
tutional responsibility to "administer that penalty in a way that can 
rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom death is an 
1375 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Baldus Study]. An earlier version of the Baldus Study appeared 
a year prior to the publication of Professor White's book. Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Com-
parative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983). 
17. The authors noted the striking similarity of the results they obtained. Barnett Study, 
supra note 16, at 1361-62; Baldus Study, supra note 16, at 1397-99. 
18. Barnett Study, supra note 16, at 1343; Baldus Study, supra note 16, at 1396. 
19. Barnett Study, supra note 16, at 1342; Baldus Study, supra note 16, at 1396. 
20. These figures are calculated by combining the categories of defendants in each study who 
were guilty ofnonheinous crimes. See Barnett Study, supra note 16, at 1342; Baldus Study, supra 
note 16, at 1396. 
21. Barnett in particular emphasized his inability to identify any explanation for why these 
defendants had been given the death penalty. Barnett Study, supra note 16, at 1345-46, 1352-53. 
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appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not."22 
The decision in Gregg was based on the assumption that prosecu-
tors and juries were limiting the application of the death penalty to 
"extreme cases," and on a holding that capital punishment was appro-
priate in precisely such circumstances. The available data suggests 
that the Court's prediction is accurate regarding a substantial number 
of the instances in which the death penalty is being imposed. The 
types of situations in which juries will ordinarily impose the death 
penalty are cases that a judge or ordinary citizen might well character-
ize as particularly egregious.23 The Barnett study found that the three 
critical factors for predicting whether a defendant would receive the 
death penalty were: (1) whether the murder was premeditated; (2) 
whether the victim was a stranger; and (3) whether the murder was 
committed in a particularly horrendous manner. 24 Where two of these 
three factors were present, well over fifty percent of the defendants 
were ultimately sentenced to death. This data strongly indicates that a 
significant number of the defendants sentenced to death would have 
received that sentence regardless of the judge, jury, or prosecutor in-
volved in the case. 
But it is equally clear that a substantial number of defendants have 
been sentenced to death in circumstances in which a majority of simi-
larly situated defendants are not being given capital sentences. The 
decision regarding who among defendants committing nonextreme of-
fenses will live or die appears to be neither predictable nor intelligible; 
the statutory sentencing standards that may have produced some uni-
formity in the treatment of the most extreme cases have evidently 
failed to bring about any coherent treatment of other defendants. The 
imposition of the death penalty on a small minority of the defendants 
22. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984). 
23. It may not be fortuitous that the disposition of capital punishment cases in the Supreme 
Court appears to correlate with the egregiousness of the crime involved. Compare Baldwin v. 
Alabama, 105 S. Ct. 2727, 2729-30 (1985) (victim sodomized, raped, stabbed, choked, and run 
over with car; death sentence affirmed); Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 847 (1985) (premedi-
tated killing of young boy, body sexually abused; death sentence affirmed); Spaziano v. Florida, 
468 U.S. 447, 450 (1984) (torture murder of two women; death sentence affirmed); and Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1984) (three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnap-
ping, severe assaults, attempted murders, and attempted extortion and theft; death sentence 
affirmed), with Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(victim killed when she screamed during robbery; death sentence reversed); Francis v. Franklin, 
105 S. Ct. 1965, 1969 (1985) (victim killed when he slammed door, causing defendant to fire his 
gun; conviction reversed); and Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1090-91 (1985) (delusional 
defendant who believed that he was the Lord's "sword of vengeance"; death sentence and convic-
tion reversed because indigent defendant did not have assistance of psychiatrist). On retrial Ake 
was again convicted, but the jury voted not to impose the death penalty. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 
1986, at A15, col. 1 (late ed.). 
24. This is a very rough summary of the criteria used by Barnett. See Barnett Study, supra 
note 16, at 1338-42, 1364-70; see also Baldus Study, supra note 16, at 1396 (criteria used in that 
study). 
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guilty of less egregious offenses appears to retain precisely the degree 
of arbitrariness condemned in Furman. 
If the Supreme Court is to reconcile the principles of Furman and 
the assumptions underlying Gregg with actual experience under 
guided discretion statutes, it will have to narrow the circumstances in 
which capital punishment can be imposed to the types of cases in 
which the likelihood of a capital sentence is fairly high, and in which 
the danger that its imposition will be arbitrary is thus reasonably low. 
Making that distinction will require some difficult judgments. A state 
statute defining capital murder so broadly that only five percent of 
those covered are actually sentenced to death clearly has not met that 
standard; conversely, a statute that limits the death penalty to cases so 
extreme that juries and prosecutors favor death in ninety percent of all 
cases would not raise any obvious problem under Furman. There is, 
however, no particular rate of imposition that marks a clear boundary 
between uniformity and arbitrariness. 
On the other hand, a substantial historical and constitutional pre-
cedent exist~ for Supreme Court action limiting the types of murder 
cases in which the death penalty can be imposed in order to reduce the 
arbitrariness in the imposition of that penalty. In eighteenth-century 
England, defendants convicted of most felonies were technically sub-
ject to a mandatory death sentence. In reality, however, a host of 
practices existed, chief among them a refusal by juries to return con-
victions for those offenses, which prevented the imposition of the 
death penalty in most instances. The result was precisely the sort of 
system condemned by Furman, one in which, for example, a handful 
of unlucky horse thieves or forgers would die for an offense that ordi-
narily resulted only in imprisonment. The colonies and states, and 
later England itself, responded to this situation by redefining what 
conduct was to be treated as a capital offense, generally limiting that 
penalty to murder, the crime that prosecutors and juries in 1800 ap-
parently regarded as ordinarily warranting the death penalty. Later in 
that century, when juries began to balk at imposition of the death pen-
alty for all homicides, recognizing that some killings were less culpable 
than others, the states responded by delineating several different de-
grees of murder, limiting capital punishment to the most extreme 
forms of the offense. 
It would doubtless be possible to narrow again the definition of 
capital murder to the categories of cases in which the death penalty is 
imposed in a substantial portion, a majority for example, of all prose-
cutions. The California death penalty statute upheld in Pulley 25 was 
framed to narrow substantially the types of murder cases in which the 
imposition of the death penalty could even be considered by thejury,26 
25. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
26. See 465 U.S. at 51 n.13. The Court in Pulley emphasized, in upholding that statute, that 
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and thus. precluded California juries from considering, and doubtless 
deterred California prosecutors from even seeking, the death penalty 
in some of the types of cases in which its imposition in other jurisdic-
tions is technically possible but a practical rarity. Even in the face of 
evidence that restrictions such as those in the Pulley statute are needed 
to comply with Furman, however, the Court may balk at announcing 
a constitutional rule with the degree of specificity necessary to distin-
guish between cases in which the death penalty is regularly applied 
and cases in which it is only infrequently utilized. 
The Court has other means available to it, however, for moving 
toward the same result; indeed, even if the Court declines to face up to 
the Furman-Gregg problem as such, other constitutional principles 
will tend to lead to a similar result. Writing in 1976, Professor White 
correctly foresaw that the Court would declare unconstitutional the 
imposition of the death penalty for rape, as it did the next year in 
Coker v. Georgia. 27 In Coker the Court reasoned that the rare imposi-
tion of the death penalty for rape demonstrated that capital punish-
ment was widely regarded as a disproportionate sanction for a crime 
other than murder. As White observes, under both Coker and the sub-
sequent decision in Enmund v. Florida, 28 the actual practice of juries 
in deciding whether to impose the death penalty in a particular cate-
gory of cases is of vital if not decisive significance in assessing whether, 
measured by community values, the imposition of the death penalty 
for that category of cases is excessive and thus constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment (pp. 13, 95). The Barnett and Baldus studies pro-
vide precisely the sort of information to which Coker and Enmund 
attach critical significance. It appears, for example, that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty for an unpremeditated murder arising out of 
a lover's quarrel or barroom brawl is as rare as the imposition of the 
death penalty for rape or for a felony murder involving no intent to 
kill. In Coker the Court thought that the imposition of the death pen-
alty in less than one of ten rape cases demonstrated the disproportion-
ality of the death sentence for that particular crime. If the Court were 
to apply to various types of murder the standards of Coker and En-
mund, it would be compelled to conclude that the death penalty was 
generally regarded by juries as excessive, and was thus unconstitu-
tional, in a variety of specific types of cases. Over time a series of such 
decisions would narrow the types of cases in which a state could im-
pose the death penalty to those in which experience demonstrated that 
the penalty is imposed with a substantial degree of frequency. 
it limited "the death sentence to a small subclass of capital-eligible cases." 465 U.S. at 53. The 
categories of capital murder delineated by the California statute in Pulley are significantly 
broader than the categories in which actual experience shows the death penalty is regularly 
applied. 
27. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
28. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
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A similar narrowing, albeit an indirect and erratic one, is likely to 
follow from the Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington. 29 
Strickland holds that a defendant who has been denied effective assis-
tance of counsel is not entitled to have his conviction or sentence over-
turned unless there is a substantial reason to believe that the denial of 
counsel affected the outcome of the trial or sentencing proceeding. 30 
In Strickland itself, the Court denied such relief because it regarded 
the evidence as so overwhelming in support of the prosecution that 
any denial of effective assistance of counsel was unlikely to have af-
fected the outcome of the proceeding.31 The available sentencing stud- · 
ies make it possible to delineate the categories of cases in which the 
likelihood that the death penalty would be imposed is well under half, 
and in many instances under one in ten. In cases of this sort it will 
never be possible to say with assurance that a denial of effective coun-
sel might not have affected the resulting sentence; on the contrary, 
precisely because the imposition of the death penalty in these catego-
ries of cases is essentially inexplicable, any constitutional error, no 
matter how slight, might well have been the difference between a sen-
tence of death and a sentence of imprisonment. Thus the criteria fash-
ioned by Barnett and Baldus to define cases in which the death penalty 
is only rarely imposed also delineate a group of cases in which virtu-
ally any constitutional error at the sentencing stage would be revers-
ible error. Because, as Professor White notes, ineffective assistance of 
counsel is particularly likely to be a problem in capital cases (pp. 13-
14), a conscientious consideration of such claims in light of Strickland 
is likely to lead to reversals of death sentences in many of the types of 
cases in which that sentence was unlikely. 
The courts will be impelled toward the same result if they come to 
take seriously the evidence that whether or not a defendant is sen-
tenced to death is often affected by the race of the defendant and that 
of his victim. The Supreme Court has already recognized that the dis-
cretion inherent in the administration of a capital punishment statute 
provides "a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but re-
main undetected."32 Initial empirical studies of capital cases as a 
whole indicate that the likelihood of a death sentence is substantially 
higher if the victim was white or the killer black. 33 The more refined 
Barnett and Baldus studies have confirmed and qualified that conclu-
sion. The decision to impose the death penalty does not correlate sig-
nificantly with race in those extreme cases in which the death penalty 
29. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
30. 466 U.S. at 694. 
31. 466 U.S. at 700. 
32. Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1986). 
33. See Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Stat-
utes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death 
Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981). 
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is almost always, or almost never, imposed. But in the intermediate 
cases, where the death penalty is imposed occasionally but not ordina-
rily, the correlation of that sentence with the race of the victim and 
perpetrator is not only pronounced, but substantially greater than was 
initially perceived to be the case for capital punishment cases as a 
whole.34 Thus the more conservative response to this evidence of ra-
cial discrimination in sentencing would be not to abolish the death 
penalty.in all cases, but rather to forbid the use of that penalty in those 
marginal cases in which the decision is likely to tum on race. 
The interconnection of these issues demonstrates the danger of a 
"general theoretical" approach to capital punishment issues. On their 
face the decisions in Gregg, Coker, and Strickland seem unrelated to 
one another or to the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimi-
nation. Viewed in light of actual sentencing experience, however, the 
principles and implementation of these decisions tend to converge. 
That convergence may be of considerable practical importance in at 
least the short term. Whatever the original rationale of Gregg, in the 
last decade a majority of the Supreme Court has been extremely resis-
tant to any argument that might result in the invalidation for essen-
tially procedural reasons of a large number of existing death sentences. 
In 1972 the fact that hundreds of defendants faced execution seems to 
have contributed to the decision in Furman effectively striking down 
every capital punishment statute then in existence; today the prospect 
that a significant number of death row inmates might escape execution 
appears to militate against sustaining constitutional challenges to a 
specific death sentence or procedure. But while a general reconsidera-
tion of Gregg seems unlikely for the present, despite the existence of 
the type of evidence unavailable in 1976, the Court has remained will-
ing to consider arguments that the imposition of the death penalty on 
a specific individual or group of individuals is excessive, or carries with 
it an undue risk of error.35 Thus while the Court seems inclined to 
overlook procedural problems rather than reverse the sentences of de-
fendants who have committed particularly heinous crimes, it has been 
more scrupulous in reviewing claims that the imposition of the death 
penalty in less egregious cases may have been unwarranted:36 Devel-
34. Barnett Study, supra note 16, at 1350-51; Baldus Study, supra note 16, at 1399-406. 
35. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985) (argument by prosecutor that 
appellate courts will reconsider a death sentence); Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985) 
(denial of assistance of psychiatrist to indigent defendant whose sanity was clearly in doubt). 
36. Although the Court does not openly acknowledge applying such a distinction, a number 
of its decisions are difficult to explain on any other basis. For example, in Beck v. Alabama, 447 
U.S. 625 (1980), the Court overturned the death sentence of a defendant who had participated in 
a burglary during which his accomplice, apparently without premeditation or warning, struck 
and killed their victim. In explaining that decision the Court noted that Alabama law directed 
the jury to return the death penalty in such cases, while leaving the ultimate determination of the 
sentence to the trial judge; the majority observed that it was "manifest that the jury's verdict 
must have a tendency to motivate the judge to impose the same sentence that the jury did." 44 7 
U.S. at 645. Five years later the constitutionality of that statute was challenged on the ground 
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opments in this area may thus be most likely to follow from applica-
tion of the principles of Coker and Enmund to other types of cases in 
which the imposition of the death penalty is in practice relatively rare. 
The continuing innovation by the states of new procedures for ad-
ministering capital punishment statutes, together with the emerging 
body of information regarding the impact of those practices, will nec-
essarily spawn an ongoing series of constitutional issues. 
II. THE WITHERSPOON EXPERIENCE 
In Witherspoon v. ll/inois 37 the Supreme Court fashioned a quite 
different type of compromise between vindicating constitutional prin-
ciples and respecting a state's interest in the retention of capital pun-
ishment. Witherspoon recognized that the wholesale exclusion of 
veniremen who had reservations about the death penalty could result 
in the creation of a hanging jury uncommonly likely to favor the exe-
cution of a capital defendant. Rather than simply prohibit any inquiry 
into a venireman's attitude towards capital punishment, however, the 
Court in Witherspoon attempted to draw a fine line delineating pre-
cisely which jurors could and could not be excused for cause. Wither-
spoon limited such exclusions to those jurors who stated that they 
would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty 
regardless of the evidence, and those whose attitude toward the death 
penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to a 
defendant's guilt.38 Thus the process of striking the balance between a 
defendant's interest in a constitutionally selected jury and a prosecu-
tor's desire to impose the death penalty was left for implementation on 
a case-by-case basis. In the years since Witherspoon prosecutors have 
sought in virtually every capital case to remove jurors for cause based 
on their views regarding the death penalty, and arguments that such 
exclusions were unconstitutional have been the single most common 
issue in capital punishment appeals. 39 
Professor White correctly observes that "the lower courts have had 
enormous difficulty in administering" Witherspoon's distinction be-
tween jurors with only general conscientious or religious scruples and 
that it made a mandatory jury verdict part of the sentencing process. The defendant at issue had 
been charged with raping and sodomizing his victim, and then killing her by stabbing her, chok-
ing her, running her over with a car, and then cutting her throat with a hatchet. A majority of 
the Court, in upholding the death sentence imposed on that defendant, held that it "defie[d] logic 
to assume that a judge will be swayed to impose the death penalty" because the jury, in compli-
ance with state law, had included such a sentence in its verdict. Baldwin v. Alabama, 105 S. Ct. 
2727, 2736 (1985). 
37. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
38. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. 
39. See generally Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously: The Search for Death-Qualified 
Jurors, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 977 (1984). 
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jurors who would automatically vote against the death penalty regard-
less of the evidence presented at trial: 
The line that separates these two groups of veniremen is not very clear. 
A prospective juror may be absolutely opposed to capital punishment 
but still feel that there might be some case in which she would at least 
want to consider the evidence before deciding whether to vote against 
the death penalty. In this type of situation, the distinction between op-
posing the death penalty and automatically voting against it may be too 
subtle for ordinary minds to grasp. [p. 4]. 
The theoretical distinction established by Witherspoon was indeed to 
spawn philosophical and jurisprudential issues that would sorely test 
the analytic skill, if not the patience, of the most ingenious academic. 
The application of Witherspoon in the real world has been even 
more difficult. Even if it had proved possible to agree on what types of 
scruples fall on which side of the constitutional boundary, actual ju-
rors have simply proved unable in a large µumber of cases to delineate 
their views in the detail, or with the certainty, that Witherspoon seems 
to require. Some jurors candidly admit under questioning that they 
simply do not know how they would act if called upon to consider 
imposition of the death penalty. An even larger number have ex-
pressed uncertainty as to the precise nature of their views, or have 
given different answers to the often differently phrased questions asked 
by the prosecution and defense.40 The process of administering 
Witherspoon has been compounded by the identity of the personnel 
involved. Although the legal and practical problems raised by Wither-
spoon are enormously complex, defense attorneys in capital cases have 
only occasionally had any significant prior experience with death pen-
alty litigation, and ordinarily have no familiarity with Witherspoon is-
sues. The types of questions, arguments, and objections that might aid 
implementation of Witherspoon are thus only rarely raised by defense 
counsel. State court trial judges, who often sit on a wide variety of 
civil and criminal cases, typically have little understanding of or expe-
rience with Witherspoon issues. Prosecutors, of course, are likely to be 
more familiar with these problems, but their interest lies in excluding 
as many scrupled jurors as possible, not in faithfully adhering to the 
commands of Witherspoon; thus prosecutors will naturally object for 
cause to almost any scrupled jurors, and judges and defense counsel 
have often been ill equipped to deal with the complex issues raised by 
such objections. 
After seventeen years of experience with Witherspoon it was appar-
ent to judges and lawyers alike that the theoretical and practical diffi-
culties raised by it were calling into question the constitutionality of 
many, perhaps even most, death sentences. Against that background 
40. See id. at 993-1032. 
February-April 1986] Capital Punishment Conundrum 729 
the Supreme Court attempted in Wainwright v. Witt 41 to refashion the 
balance that had been struck by Witherspoon between constitutional 
and nonconstitutional values. Rather than articulate a distinction be-
tween excludable and nonexcludable jurors so clear that state courts 
would only rarely violate the rule, however, the Court in Witt chose 
simply to shift the vague boundary so as to reduce the number of 
nonexcludable jurors. 
In the long term Witt is likely to compound rather than eliminate 
the problems that Professor White identified in the administration of 
Witherspoon. The new standard announced by Witt is that a juror 
may be excused for cause if his or her views would "prevent or sub-
stantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance 
with his instructions and his oath."42 Under Witherspoon the inquiry 
focused on whether a juror would never vote for the death penalty no 
matter what the evidence; a juror might well be uncertain as to the 
nature of his views, but at least he would have had a reasonable idea 
what it meant to "never vote for the death penalty." But a juror asked 
in the words of Witt whether his views would "prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath" might well have no idea what that question 
meant. A juror could not assess the possible inconsistency of his views 
with his "duties," "instructions," and "oath" unless he was told what 
those duties, oath, and instructions would be. The nature of a juror's 
duty, oath, and instructions with regard to the penalty phase of a trial 
varies from state to state; a juror's scruples might be inconsistent with 
his duty in Texas, with his oath in Florida, or with his instructions in 
Alabama, but be entirely consistent with his legal obligations in Cali-
fornia or some other state. Only by explaining to a venireman in detail 
the substance of the oath and instructions that will be given to the 
jury, or by focusing questions on specific aspects of that oath or those 
instructions, will it be possible to ascertain whether the venireman's 
scruples would prevent or substantially impair obedience to one or 
more specific portions of that oath or instructions with regard to sen-
tencing. This problem did not arise in Witt because the juror there 
was challenged and excluded on the basis of an apparent conflict be-
tween her scruples and her ability to pass impartially on the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant.43 The juror needed no particular under-
standing of Florida law to be able to respond to such an inquiry; in-
deed, her answer would doubtless have been the same in any state that 
imposed the death penalty. But an inquiry about the juror's ability to 
do her duty at the sentencing phase of the proceeding would have been 
41. 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985). 
42. 105 S. Ct. at 850 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980) (emphasis deleted)). 
43. 105 S. Ct. at 848. 
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meaningless without an explanation of precisely what duty Florida law 
would impose on her at such a hearing. 
In the hope of reducing the role of federal courts in Witherspoon 
litigation, the Court in Witt also ruled that the decision of a state trial 
judge holding a venireman excludable under Witherspoon is a "fac-
tual" finding, and thus entitled to a "presumption of correctness" 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).44 That holding, far from simplifying 
Witherspoon litigation, is certain to embroil federal courts in a vast 
new array of legal and factual issues that must be resolved in order to 
determine the applicability of section 2254(d). For example: 
(i) In Witt, as is ordinarily the case, the state judge gave no expla-
nation of his decision to exclude the disputed juror; the Supreme 
Court, noting that a state judge is presumed to have appli~d the cor-
rect legal standard, 45 reasoned that the judge must have implicitly 
made the factual findings which were necessary as a matter of law to 
exclude a juror. 46 But the cases cited by the Court for that presump-
tion are expressly limited to situations in which the nature of the cor-
rect legal standard is not a matter of controversy or dispute.47 There 
have in fact been relatively few disputes about the standard for exclud-
ing a juror, like the juror in Witi, whose scruples might interfere with 
his ability to decide on guilt or innocence. But disputes regarding the 
meaning of Witherspoon with regard to sentencing have been legion, 48 
and Witt alters but does not eliminate those controversies. Once a 
federal habeas corpus petitioner identifies a colorable legal dispute as 
to the standard for excluding a disputed juror, the "presumption of 
correctness" relied on in Witt would simply evaporate. 
44. 105 S. Ct. at 853-55. Section 2254 provides that, except under certain specified circum-
stances, in a federal habeas corpus proceeding "a determination after a hearing on the merits of a 
factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the appli-
cant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written 
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be 
correct .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). 
45. 105 S. Ct. at 856. 
46. 105 S. Ct. at 855-57. 
47. The Court relied expressly on Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Townsend made 
clear that the presumption that the state court applied the correct legal standard, and thus the 
presumed existence offactfinding by the state judge, was appropriate only when the relevant legal 
principles were both clear and undisputed: 
Unless the district judge can be reasonably certain that the state trier would have granted 
relief if he had believed petitioner's allegations, he cannot be sure that the state trier in 
denying relief disbelieved these allegations. If any combination of the facts alleged would 
prove a violation of constitutional rights and the issue of law on those facts presents a diffi-
cult or novel problem for decision, any hypothesis as to the relevant factual determinations 
of the state trier involves the purest speculation. The federal court cannot exclude the possi-
bility that the trial judge believed facts which showed a deprivation of constitutional rights 
and yet (erroneously) concluded that relief should be denied. 
372 U.S. at 315-16. The other cases cited in Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 856, simply quote and rely on 
Townsend. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983); La Vallee v. Delle Rose, 410 
U.S. 690, 694-95 (1973). 
48. See text at note 40 supra. 
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(ii) In order to ascertain the legal standard applied by the state 
judge in Witt, the Supreme Court referred to the questions asked and 
instructions given to other veniremen by the trial judge.49 ln future 
cases prosecutors and defense counsel alike will have to scrutinize the 
state judge's questions and instructions to determine what the judge 
believed the applicable legal standard to be. A defendant need not 
establish with certainty that the state judge was guilty of legal error; 
once the parties identify any serious question regarding the legal stan-
dard the judge was applying, it becomes impossible to infer from the 
judge's action in excluding a juror what facts he must have found in 
order to have taken that action. Where a prosecutor has directly or 
indirectly argued for an incorrect interpretation of the law, any possi-
bility that the trial judge may have accepted that argument will ordi-
narily defeat the section 2254( d) presumption. 
(iii) Although Witt emphasizes that demeanor may play an impor-
tant role in a state judge's decision, it does not suggest that the section 
2254(d) presumption of correctness could salvage a state court deci-
sion excluding a venireman whose actual answers clearly fell short of 
the standard of Witt and Witherspoon. In Witt the defendant argued 
that the statements of the disputed juror were insufficient to justify 
exclusion because the juror had indicated only that her views would 
"interfere" with her ability to pass on guilt or innocence; the defen-
dant contended that the juror might have meant only that her views 
would have made it unpleasant to sit as a juror, or created merely an 
insubstantial problem. In rejecting this contention the Court noted 
that, while the term "interfere" was ambiguous, one possible meaning 
was to "create an [insurmountable] obstacle"; that ambiguity was one 
which the trial judge was free to resolve on the basis of demeanor.50 
But this reliance on presumed demeanor evidence was appropriate 
only because the term "interfere" was indeed ambiguous; the result 
would presumably be different if a juror's literal testimony contained 
no such ambiguity. Thus dispute about the terms used in both ques-
tions and answers must remain an important part of litigation under 
Witt, just as it was, albeit in a somewhat different form, under 
Witherspoon. 
(iv) Witt's section 2254 analysis depends entirely on the presumed 
existence of a legal analysis and factfinding on the part of a state judge 
who articulated neither. The judge's silence in that particular case 
may be understandable in view of the fact that the defense attorney 
neither spught to question the disputed juror nor objected to her exclu-
sion. Under those circumstances the Supreme Court believed that the 
trial judge "was given no reason to think that elaboration was neces-
49. 105 S. Ct. at 856 & n.12. 
50. 105 S. Ct. at 857. 
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sary."51 But this entire method of analysis would seem to be suspect if 
a defendant objected to the exclusion of a disputed juror, and would 
certainly be inappropriate if a defendant expressly requested that the 
state judge explain the legal basis of his decision, or set forth any find-
ings he was making regarding the meaning of the juror's statements. 
Such requests would be entirely reasonable, since they would permit 
the defendant to do precisely what the defendant failed to do in Witt: 
ask further questions needed to "resolv[e] any ... ambiguities"52 per-
ceived by the trial judge. A trial judge's refusal to accede to such a 
request and articulate the basis of his proposed decision would inter-
fere with the defendant's ability to present his case at trial, and would 
obstruct appellate review, as deliberately and effectively as if the trial 
judge willfully destroyed the court reporter's notes of the voir dire 
hearing. 
(v) The decision in Witt correctly stressed the importance of the 
role of defense counsel in questioning prospective jurors. Practical ex-
perience under Witherspoon has made it clear that jurors can easily be 
led to give disqualifying answers by the use of carefully phrased prose-
cution questions; time and again answers obtained in this way have 
been discredited by further questioning by defense counsel which 
demonstrated that the views of the disputed juror fell well within the 
protections of Witherspoon. 53 In light of that experience, a refusal by a 
state judge to permit defense counsel to ask questions, or to ask addi-
tional questions to clarify responses obtained by a prosecutor, would 
deny the defendant the fair and adequate hearing required by section 
2254(d)(6). 
This array of problems is typical of the sort of morass into which 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly fallen when it has chosen to maxi-
mize a state's ability to impose the death penalty, rather than adopt a 
clear rule of simple application. The decision in Gregg to avoid man-
dating any particular sentencing procedure54 committed the Supreme 
Court to dealing on a case-by-case basis with every procedural and 
evidentiary quirk that the various states might devise for imposing the 
death penalty. Professor White's book provides a preview of some of 
the many issues that will thus have to be resolved. 55 
Decisions such as Gregg and Witt do not forsake entirely the con-
stitutional principles that may be at issue, but relegate them to evalua-
tion on a more fact specific, often individualized, basis. This may 
51. 105 S. Ct. at 856. 
52. 105 S. Ct. at 858. 
53. See Schnapper, supra note 39, at 1015-32. 
54. The Court has repeatedly emphasized its unwillingness "to say that there is any one right 
way for a State to set up its capital sentencing scheme." Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 
(1984), and cases cited. 
55. See particularly pp. 11-12 and pp. 203-63. 
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avoid an immediate and major limitation on state practices, but in the 
long term it spawns the sort of administrative problems that existed 
under Witherspoon, and that seem certain to re-emerge under Witt. 
The seemingly endless challenges to particular practices or death 
sentences is thus, to some degree, a situation of the Court's own mak-
ing. Had the Supreme Court in 1968 simply forbidden the exclusion 
of jurors based on conscientious scruples, the entire body of capital 
punishment litigation prompted by Witherspoon, and continued by 
Witt, would never have emerged. Actual experience in states that 
never sought to exclude scrupled jurors makes it clear that the aboli-
tion of such exclusions would not have prevented continued applica-
tion of the death penalty .. 
The value of a broader approach, casting aside practices fraught 
with constitutional problems rather than trying to delineate on a case-
by-case basis precisely which actions are and are not constitutional, is 
well illustrated by practical experience under Miranda v. Arizona. 56 
As Professor White notes, Miranda adopts a per se rule regarding the 
conduct of custodial interrogations; rather than become embroiled in 
individualized disputes about what police officers should say to sus-
pects, the Supreme Court in 1966 spelled out precisely what warning 
was to be given, and what answers were to be deemed sufficient to 
preclude further questioning. To grasp the practical importance of 
that per se approach, one need only reflect for a moment on what 
would have occurred if the Court in Miranda, as occurred in Witt, had 
declined to mandate any set language, choosing instead to permit 
every police officer and prosecutor to draft his or her own warning. 
Free to fashion whatever admonitions they pleased, the states would 
have devised an enormous variety of statements calculated to provide 
as little information as possible about either the right to counsel or the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Under such circumstances judi-
cial administration of the principles of Miranda would have beeri a 
nightmare. · 
Whatever the original rationale of this prophylactic rule, the Court 
now correctly regards simplicity as the preeminent virtue of Miranda. 
In Berkemer v. McCarty 57 the Court unanimously held that Miranda 
should be applied to interrogations of suspects being held on misde-
meanor charges, reasoning that the implementation of a distinction 
between suspected misdemeanants and suspected felons would con-
front the courts with byzantine doctrinal problems, and "seriously ... 
impair the simplicity and clarity of the holding of Miranda. "58 The 
Court emphasized, as it did in Oregon v. Elstad, 59 its belief that the 
56. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
57. 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
58. 468 U.S. at 432. 
59. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985). 
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"bright line" established by Miranda60 had been effective in eliminat-
ing much litigation regarding the voluntariness of particular 
confessions. 61 
Professor White praises Miranda for drawing a "bright line," and 
suggests that a number of peripheral issues regarding the scope of Mi-
randa should be resolved by the adoption of additional per se rules 
(pp. 163-84). Whatever the merits of these proposals with regard to 
Miranda, this is an approach that warrants serious consideration in 
the resolution of issues related to capital punishment. Decisions such 
as Witherspoon and Witt, which attempt to draw unworkably fine lines 
in a complex legal world, will inevitably generate an enormous 
number of colorable claims of legal error. Shifting the standards in 
favor of the prosecutor, as was apparently the purpose of Witt, does 
little to alleviate these administrative problems; increasing the propor-
tion of veniremen who are arguably excludable does not necessarily 
clarify the distinction between those veniremen and others who cannot 
be excluded for cause. However much the Court may modify consti-
tutional doctrine to make it easier to impose the death penalty, prose-
cutors are still going to try to exceed or evade any restrictions whose 
substance is not crystal clear. Similarly, the absence of specific Court-
mandated procedures under Gregg has had precisely the result the 
Court foresaw would occur if the per se approach of Miranda were 
abandoned, prompting a welter of litigation creating on a case-by-case 
basis "an elaborate set of rules, interlaced with exceptions and subtle 
distinctions. "62 
Rules such as those in Witherspoon and Witt are more than just an 
administrative burden on the courts. As such rules become more com-
plex and fact-intensive, their correct application in specific cases will 
depend increasingly on the quality of representation that defendants 
have, particularly at trial. Thus the effect of Witherspoon and Witt is 
not simply to allow the state to execute some defendants who would 
not be sentenced to death were the Court to forbid the exclusion of 
60. Elstad, IOS S. Ct. at 1292 n.1 ("bright line"), 1296 ("A subsequent administration of 
Miranda warnings to a suspect who has [earlier] given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordi-
narily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier state-
ment."), 1298 ("[I]n evaluating the voluntariness of his statements •.• [t]he fact that a suspect 
chooses to speak after being informed of his rights is, of course, highly probative."). 
61. The Court explained in Berkemer: 
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not 
coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing ... and as much as possible to free courts 
from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether 
particular confessions were voluntary .... 
We do not suggest that compliance with Miranda conclusively establishes the voluntari-
ness of a subsequent confession. But cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argu-
ment that a self-incriminating statement was "compelled" despite the fact that the law 
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare. 
468 U.S. at 433 & n.20. 
62. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 432. 
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any jurors on account of religious or conscientious scruples. In the 
administration of a complex rule, some defendants who might have 
received the death penalty despite the inclusion on their juries of all 
scrupled jurors will, because of errors in complying with Witherspoon 
and Witt, receive only life sentences, while individuals who would 
have been sentenced to life imprisonment had those decisions been ad-
hered to will, because of unavoidable errors in application, be sen-
tenced to die. Thus the Court, by adopting complex fact-intensive 
rules, introduces into the sentencing process precisely the type of arbi-
trariness that Furman and even Gregg condemn. 
The adoption of clear-line prophylactic rules would also have an-
other enormously desirable consequence. The increasing number of 
individuals under sentence of death - today well over a thousand -
has complicated the likely consequences and significance of any consti-
tutional decision. The acceptance of any new constitutional argument, 
or even the conscientious enforcement of a well-established doctrine, is 
likely to call into question the sentences or convictions of literally hun-
dreds_of the nation's most hardened and dangerous criminals. It 
would blink reality to pretend that the Supreme Court is not seriously 
concerned about the retroactive impact of its decisions in this area. In 
his discussion of mounting evidence that death-qualified juries - ju-
ries from which certain opponents of the death penalty have been ex-
cluded - are significantly biased in favor of conviction, Professor 
White notes that a Supreme Court decision sustaining his argument 
would, if retroactive, have a great impact on the administration of jus-
tice, calling into question the convictions of literally thousands of in-
mates, not only those under sentence of death, but many if not most of 
the convicted murderers in the nation (p. 9). When, following the 
publication of White's book, the Supreme Court took up the question 
of whether death-qualified juries were impermissibly conviction prone, 
the problem of retroactivity was emphasized not only in the brief for 
the state, 63 but also in questions from the bench at oral argument. 64 
The Court held in Lockhart v. McCree 65 not only that the defendant 
had failed to prove that death-qualified juries were conviction prone, 
but also that the Court would refuse even to consider in any future 
case additional information that tended to prove that such juries were 
biased. The breadth of the decision undoubtedly reflected a determina-
tion by the majority to assure that no subsequent empirical study 
could result in the release of many of the nation's most dangerous 
criminals. 
The problem that White recognizes with regard to conviction-
proneness is present, albeit in a less extreme form, in every case involv-
63. Brief for Petitioner at 20-21, Lockhart v. Mccree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). 
64. 54 U.S.L.W. 3475-76 (oral arguments, Lockhart v. McCree). 
65. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). 
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ing a challenge to the procedures by which a state imposes the death 
penalty. In a very real sense the most important precedent influencing 
the Court's present decisions in capital punishment cases may be, not 
Furman or Gregg, but Linkletter v. Walker, 66 which establishes the 
principles for determining whether a constitutional decision will be ap-
plied retroactively. Whatever the merits of Linkletter and its progeny, 
the specter of retroactivity has an intolerable and increasingly distor-
tive effect on capital punishment appeals. When the Court manipulates 
its constitutional decisions to avoid reducing or calling into question 
the sentences of large numbers of inmates on whom the states have 
already imposed the death penalty, it decides that future defendants 
who would not be sentenced to death under a constitutional scheme 
will have to die in order to facilitate the execution of past defendants. 
The ultimate premise of such an approach is that it is better to kill 
some defendants who do not deserve to die than to spare the lives of 
some defendants who may indeed deserve that sentence. That is a 
morally and constitutionally horrendous result. 
If, as appears to be the case, the specter of retroactivity is begin-
ning to affect the Court's decisions on the merits of constitutional is-
sues, then the time may have come to reconsider the standards the 
Court uses to determine the retroactive effect of a decision. In at least 
some instances this problem, as well as the administrative difficulties 
discussed earlier, can be resolved by adopting bright-line prophylactic 
rules, the sort of rules that, because they are framed to prevent rather 
than merely define constitutional violations, are not ordinarily retroac-
tive in application. Such an approach may hold out the most realistic 
prospect for increasing the coherence, reliability, and predictability of 
capital sentencing systems. Such an approach may also provide a ba-
sis for the Court ultimately to assess whether the best of such systems 
can, in operation, meet minimal constitutional standards. 
66. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
